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Abstract 
 Recent functional neuroimaging data, acquired in studies of religious experience, have been used to 
explain and justify religion and its origins. In this paper, we critique the move from describing brain 
activity associated with self-reported religious states, to explaining why there is religion at all. 
Toward that end, first we review recent neuroimaging findings on religious experience, and show 
how those results do not necessarily support a popular notion that religion has a primitive evolu-
tionary origin. Importantly, we call into question an assumption—key to that account of religion—
concerning a conceptual relation between ‘religion’ and ‘religious experience’. Th en, we examine the 
conditions that must be met in order to explain religion on the basis of brain imaging findings. 
Moreover, we list principled reasons to be sceptical of explanations of religion in terms of the neural 
underpinnings of experiences. We conclude that the data from neuroimaging studies are not suited 
for an explanation of religion. 
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 I. Introduction 
 Recent developments in human brain functional imaging technologies—such as 
positron emission tomography (PET), functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), and single photon emission tomography (SPECT)—afford the possi-
bility of examining brain activity associated with a wide variety of mental phe-
nomena (Raichle, 1998). Now there are functional neuroimaging reports on 
religious experience (Azari et al., 2001b; Newberg et al., 2001). Such studies 
have attracted popular attention, refuelling perceived controversy between sci-
ence and religion (Begely, 2001a, 2001b; Woodward, 2001). Indeed, findings 
from recent brain imaging studies of religious experience have been used to draw 
broad conclusions about religion as such, in particular, to explain why there is 
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religion at all (Newberg & d’Aquili, 2001). Here we ask, how tenable are those 
conclusions? Specifically, the aim of this paper is to critically examine the extent 
to which functional brain imaging data of religious experience can be used to 
explain religion. 
 II. Brain and Religious Experience 
 Early and influential studies 
 Inquiry into the physiological processes associated with religious phenomena is 
not new. Indeed, there has been an ongoing debate for more than thirty years 
about whether or not, in-between seizures (i.e., the inter-ictal period), patients 
with temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) (i.e., seizure foci in the temporal lobes) show 
a distinctive personality disorder (Dewhurst & Beard, 1970; Ramachandran & 
Blakeslee, 1998; Tucker et al., 1987), commonly referred to as deepened or hyper 
‘religiosity’ (Bear, 1979; Bear & Fedio, 1977). Th e temporal lobes are part of the 
limbic system, which plays an important role in emotional processes, in particu-
lar, emotional arousal. Correspondingly, those who have argued for a distinctive 
TLE hyper religious personality, hypothesize that hyper-religiosity is rooted in 
limbic over-excitation, expressed as a generalized hyper-emotionality to other-
wise neutral events (Bear et al., 1982). 
 Th ere is also a body of literature, according to which mystical and religious 
experiences are a specific symptom of Schizophrenia (for a review see especially 
Austin, 1998), and/or occur more frequently in persons who suffer from psy-
chotic delusions and hallucinations than in normal, healthy individuals (Stifler 
et al., 1993). A recent study, using human brain functional imaging technology, 
reported an association between hyper-activation of the left  temporal lobe with 
occurrence of religious delusions in a single case study of Schizophrenia (Puri et 
al., 2001). 
 A Popular Hypothesis 
 Th e findings of studies using particular patient populations (i.e., TLE, Schizo-
phrenia), as well as those using healthy volunteers (Persinger, 1983, 1984), have 
led to the notion that the neurophysiological basis of religious phenomena is 
fundamentally a matter of an abnormal brain state, localized to the limbic system 
(Persinger, 1983, 1987). More broadly, this view hypothesizes that limbic activ-
ity is necessary for (any and all) religious experience (cf. Newberg & d’Aquili, 
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2001). Indeed, some have suggested that direct stimulation (electrically or mag-
netically) of the limbic system will artificially generate a religious experience, 
even in a person who claims to be non-religious (e.g., an atheist) (Persinger, 
1983). Conversely, others have speculated that removing limbic structures will 
render someone incapable of having religious experience (Ramachandran & 
Blakeslee, 1998). 
 Th e idea that religious experience is ‘marked’ by (dysfunctional) brain activity 
involving limbic structures has come to be known as the ‘limbic marker hypoth-
esis’ of religious experience ( Joseph, 2001). According to this hypothesis, only if 
the limbic system is active during a reported experience, can one conclude that 
religious experience has occurred. Th e absence of limbic activity would mean 
that religious experience was not present. In sum, the ‘limbic marker hypothesis’ 
forwards a conceptualisation of religious experience as rooted in a primitive 
brain-reflex response, for which thoughts and beliefs of the experient are of little 
(if any) importance. 
 Th ere has been considerable evidence cited against the TLE-religiosity 
hypothesis (Tucker, 1987). In addition, most serious scholars of religion do not 
endorse this view of religious experience (Austin, 1998; Glassman, 2002; Hood 
et al., 1996; McNamara, 2002; Peterson, 2001, 2002; Teske, 2001). However, 
the ‘limbic marker’ hypothesis of religious experience persists, and, in fact has 
only become all the more popular as new neuroscientific techniques to study the 
live human brain have emerged (e.g., Alper, 2001). 
 From religious experience to religion: An assumption 
 Th e ‘limbic marker hypothesis’ has encouraged efforts to explain the natural ori-
gin of religion on the basis of brain activity data acquired in studies of religious 
experience. Th e general idea has been that, if one can make the case that religious 
experience is rooted in evolutionarily ‘primitive’ neural circuitry (i.e., involving 
‘lower-order’ brain systems that humans share with less-evolved species), then 
one can argue that religion also has primitive evolutionary roots, that religion 
emerged as part of the natural order. On this basis, then, one could conclude that 
there is a scientifically justified naturalistic explanation for religion, and particu-
larly why there is religion at all.1 
1  Th e quest for an evolutionary basis or root to religion and religious experience is not new. See, 
Walter H. Capps, Religious Studies: Th e Making of a Discipline (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 
p 74ff. 
ARP 29_f6_65-85.indd   69 5/19/07   1:46:37 PM
70 N. P. Azari, M. Slors / Archive for the psychology of Religion 29 (2007) 67-85
 Key to this line of argument is an assumption concerning a conceptual rela-
tion between ‘religious experience’ and ‘religion’. Th at is, religious experience is 
conceptualized as the essence of religion. On this approach, in order to explain 
(the naturalistic roots of ) religion, all one needs to do is to explain (the natural-
istic roots of ) religious experience.2 Of course, this agenda additionally turns 
on there being a primitive (physiological) basis for religious experience in 
the first place. Cognitive neuroscience—in particular, human brain functional 
imaging—is the singular domain of science, which is expected to deliver best on 
this challenge. 
 Functional neuroimaging findings on religious experience 
 Recent developments in human brain functional imaging technologies—such as 
PET, fMRI, and SPECT—afford the study of the brain function in normal 
healthy individuals (Raichle, 1998). Predictably, there is a rapidly growing litera-
ture on the neurophysiological processes associated with a wide variety of nor-
mal human mental phenomena, such as imagery, arithmetic, abstract problem 
solving, and memory recall (Binkofski et al., 2000; Cabeza et al., 1997; Dehaene 
et al., 1999; Duncan et al., 2000; Kosslyn et al., 1993). Now there are two recent 
neuroimaging reports on religious experience (Azari et al., 2001a,b; Newberg et 
al., 2001).3 
 Azari et al. (2001b) used PET-CBF to study a group of self-identified ‘reli-
gious’ subjects, who were Protestant Christians, and a group of control subjects 
who were self-identified as ‘non-religious’. Specifically, the subjects in that study 
were 12 normal, healthy adults aged 28+/– 5 years (mean +/– standard devia-
tion). All were right-handed, native German speakers. Six subjects (2 women, 4 
men) were self-identified as religious, and were members of a Christian ‘Free 
Evangelical Fundamentalist Community’. Th ey were teachers at a private Chris-
tian secondary school, and had been selected for their teaching posts on the basis 
of rigorous faith-based criteria. Each of them reported having had a documented 
conversion experience, and interpreted biblical text literally as the word of God. 
According to those religious subjects, the first verse of Psalm 23 (i.e., ‘Th e Lord 
is my shepherd . . .’) was essential for each to get into and sustain a religious state, 
2  An essentialist-experientialist approach to the study of religion has been especially prominent 
in the scientific study of religion, most notably with William James. See, Walter H. Capps, Religious 
Studies: Th e Making of a Discipline (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995). 
3  Th ree earlier studies were designed to examine cerebral blood flow changes during meditative 
relaxation, conceptualized in a broader sense than in terms of religious experience (Herzog et al. 
1990; Lazar et al. 2000; Lou et al. 1999). 
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defined as ‘being in a personal relationship with God as Jesus Christ’. Six subjects 
(2 women, 4 men) were self-identified as non-religious, and were students at the 
University of Düsseldorf, Germany, studying various subjects in the natural sci-
ences. For those subjects, religion did not play any significant role in their daily 
life, and, in fact, they reported feeling somewhat indifferent to religious matters 
(i.e., none was a committed atheist, but also none felt strongly about any particu-
lar set of religious beliefs or practices). Th e two groups were matched on age, 
gender, and level of education. 
 Azari et al. employed a self-induction functional neuroimaging paradigm, 
which involved asking the subjects to induce in themselves a religious state (as 
they understood that to mean) with the help of biblical text that the religious 
subjects themselves suggested would be most effective, namely, Psalm 23. Sub-
jects were PET-scanned in six conditions (occurring in a different order for each 
subject). For each scan, the subjects were asked to induce in themselves the req-
uisite target state, with the help of particular textual material (i.e., ‘cues’). Directly 
before and aft er each scan, the felt-quality of each target state was assessed objec-
tively, using a standardized questionnaire (called the Positive Affect Negative 
Affect Scale, or PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). In addition, aft er each PET scan-
ning session, the subjects were asked to assess the extent to which each felt he/
she had attained the requisite target state (i.e., religious, happy, neutral; these 
self-assessment ratings ranged on a scale of 0-10). Th e scanning conditions were 
as follows: (1) religious-read, (2) religious-recite, (3) happy-read, (4) happy-
recite, (5) neutral-read, (6) rest. Th e textual cues used for the different task con-
ditions were: religious—the first verse of biblical Psalm 23; happy—a well-known 
German children’s nursery rhyme; and neutral—instructions on using a phone 
card, taken from the Düsseldorf telephone book. Texts were matched on length, 
and the rhyme was not associated with music. All subjects were able to recite 
from memory both the religious and happy texts at the time of the PET scan-
ning. In the read conditions, the texts were presented on a screen that was visible 
to the subjects as they lay on the scanner bed. In the recite conditions, the sub-
jects had their eyes covered, and recited the textual material silently to them-
selves. In the rest condition, they lay quietly with their eyes covered. 
 According to their self-assessment ratings, only the religious subjects achieved 
the religious state (while reciting the religious text). Th e functional brain imag-
ing results during their religious state showed a brain activation pattern that cor-
responded to their individual self-perspectives. Specifically, PET images acquired 
in the religious subjects in the religious state showed peak blood flow activation 
in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as compared to the non-religious sub-
jects. Th is activation pattern was observed also in contrast to the happy state and 
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the neutral read condition. Other activations in the religious state were the dor-
somedial frontal cortex (or, pre-SMA) and a posterior parietal area identified as 
the right precuneus. A more recent network analysis of the PET data further 
distinguished the non-religious happy emotion state from the religious state, 
again highlighting the particular importance of the prefrontal cortex in the lat-
ter (Azari et al., 2005). 
 Th e prefrontal cortex—a structure whose connectivity patterns were associ-
ated with the religious experience—is most recently understood to play an espe-
cially important role in particular kinds of social-relational cognitive processes 
(e.g., ‘mentalising’ or ‘theory of mind’) (Adolphs, 2003a,b). Specifically, findings 
from recent functional imaging studies suggest that widespread connections 
involving especially the prefrontal and medial frontal cortex are critical for rea-
soning processes that are necessary for social interactions, namely, those that 
involve ‘mentalising’—i.e., attributing independent mental states to oneself and 
others; reflecting on one’s own inner states and reading another’s mind (Calarge 
et al., 2003; Fletcher et al., 1995; Goel et al., 1995; Happe 2003; Kampe et al., 
2003; Siegal & Varley, 2002; Vogeley et al., 2001); agency detection (Blakemore 
et al., 2003); intentional (vs. incidental) self-processing (Kirchner et al. 2002); 
decision-making in social context (Sanfey et al., 2003), and complex emotions 
such as empathy and sympathy (Decety & Chaminade 2003; Wicker et al., 
2003). 
 Importantly, the PET data indicated increased blood flow in the left  amygdala 
(i.e., a limbic structure) only for the happy emotion; no significant changes in 
blood flow involving limbic structures were evident for the religious experience. 
Th is particular finding not only challenges the ‘limbic marker hypothesis’ of reli-
gious experience, but, as well, supports the conviction that religious experience 
and emotion, while related, are not exactly the same thing (Azari & Birnbacher, 
2004). 
 In sum, these recent PET findings are consistent with the idea that complex 
cognition—belief-thought, subjective awareness, learning, memory—are central 
to (at least one kind of ) religious experience, and, that limbic activity may not be 
necessary for (all kinds of ) religious experience. 
 In another recent neuroimaging investigation, Newberg et al. (2001) used 
SPECT to study Buddhist meditation. Th ey, like Azari et al., employed a self-
induction neuroimaging paradigm, in which they asked their subjects—four 
men and four women, self-described as experienced, practicing Tibetan Bud-
dhist meditators—to meditate while their brains were being scanned. Th e par-
ticipants were allowed to use incense during the scanning sessions (i.e., ‘cues’). 
Brain scan data were collected when the subject indicated that he/she was in the 
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most intense part of the meditation. Newberg et al. reported that changed blood 
flow in brain areas involved in cognitive processes (i.e. complex visual percep-
tion, attention, orientation, and verbal conceptualisation) correlated with the 
Buddhist meditation experience (e.g. areas such as the prefrontal cortex and the 
posterior parietal lobe, thought to be involved in creating mental representations 
of the self and orientation in space). Th ese investigators also did not observe 
changes in brain activity in limbic structures during the religious experience of 
their Buddhist subjects. 
 Taken together, the neuroimaging results suggest that complex cognitive pro-
cesses are central to at least some kinds of religious experience, and thus support 
a picture of religious experience as cognitive (Dupre, 1998; Gelphi, 1994; Henry, 
1991; McIntosh, 1995; Proudfoot, 1985; Schlitt, 2001; Spilka & McIntosh, 
1995; Spilka et al., 1985, 1992, 1996). On this understanding, religious experi-
ence is itself structured in terms of past and present beliefs, perceived meaning, 
and interpretation of the given experiential context. In this way, recent human 
brain imaging findings challenge the alternative, popular view that religious 
experience—and religion—is a matter of a pre-cognitive, brain reflex-response 
localized to the limbic system—i.e., the ‘limbic marker hypothesis’. Indeed, brain 
activity in limbic structures—which is central to a conceptualisation of the bio-
logical roots of religious experience (and religion)—simply was not observed in 
the neuroimaging results. 
 Despite this fact, the functional imaging data on religious experience have 
been used to argue for the naturalistic basis, and, in fact, evolutionary necessity 
of religion. Th at is, it has been argued that brain imaging data of reported reli-
gious experience show that the human brain is hardwired for religious experi-
ence, as it is for religion (Alper, 2001; Newberg & d’Aquili, 2001). Religion 
serves an evolutionary function (has a naturalistic basis), and recent brain imag-
ing data can directly demonstrate this. How tenable is such a conclusion? 
 III. Conditions for Explaining Religion using Functional Imaging Data 
 Emphasising the evolutionary necessity of religion is, of course, not merely an 
attempt at explaining why God, or rather belief in God, won’t go away. It is at 
least also a way of explaining why belief in God is there in the first place. It would 
be odd indeed to explain the sustenance of religion in naturalistic, evolutionary 
terms, but not its emergence. If we’re looking for a naturalistic explanation of 
religion, it is not enough to explain its sustenance and leave its emergence a mys-
tery. So, like the ‘limbic marker hypothesis’, cognitivist attempts at explaining 
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religion in neuroscientific terms must involve attempts to explain the emergence 
of religion. 
 In this section we shall concentrate merely on the question of emergence as 
regards neuroscientific explanations of religion. First we determine two condi-
tions, which have to be met by neuroscientific data in order to be suitable for 
explaining religion. Next we argue that the limbic marker hypothesis can meet 
only one of these demands. Hence it cannot explain the emergence of religion. 
Aft er that, the cognitivist alternatives of the hypothesis are put to the test. 
Although it may seem at first that at least one of these alternatives, the view of 
Newberg and d’Aquili, can avoid the problems with the limbic marker hypothesis 
and meet both conditions, we shall argue that this can only be the case on a much 
too narrow, and in fact incorrect, understanding of the myths sustaining religion. 
 What does it take to explain the emergence of religion primarily on the basis of 
brain data? Two constraints 
 If the emergence of religion is to be explained primarily in terms of neuroscientific 
data, then these data must meet at least two constraints. First of all the existence 
of these data as well as our characterization of them must be independent of an 
existing religious tradition. If we have to invoke a religious tradition in order to 
claim the existence of these data, or in order to describe or characterize their 
peculiarities relevant to the explanation of religion, then obviously these data 
cannot be used to explain the emergence of that very religious traditions, on pain 
of vicious circularity. Let us call the required independence of the neuroscientific 
data from the religious tradition, whose emergence are alleged to explain the 
noncircularity constraint. 
 Apart from the noncircularity constraint there is another (equally obvious) 
constraint on neuroscientific data that purport to explain the emergence of a 
religious tradition. Th ese data must—ceteris paribus—indicate sufficient condi-
tions for the emergence of such a tradition. Of course the ceteris paribus clause is 
important here. Brain properties alone may well be strictly insufficient for the 
emergence of religion, since all kinds of further conditions may have to be met 
too in order for religion to emerge as a consequence of these properties. Th ink, 
for example, of the existence of a language or of the availability of conditions for 
physical survival. As long as these extra conditions can trivially or unproblemati-
cally be assumed to be obtained, they can be considered background conditions 
for a neuroscientific explanation of the emergence of religion. Th us the 
neuroscientific data can be considered ceteris paribus sufficient for the emergence 
of religion. We may call this the sufficiency constraint. 
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 Th e Limbic marker hypothesis 
 Th e ‘limbic marker hypothesis’ and associated theories are about neuroscientific 
evidence that appears to meet the noncircularity constraint. Th e experiences for 
which these theories cite neuroscientific evidence are entirely non-cognitive and 
can hence be characterized in complete abstraction from any religious tradition. 
Moreover, there is no problem whatsoever in imagining these experiences occur-
ring prior to the emergence of institutionalized religion. Add the overly plausible 
claim that our current brains are relevantly similar to those of people living 
before institutionalized religion emerged, and it is clear that the ‘limbic marker 
hypothesis’ can claim to pass our first test. Unfortunately, though, the limbic 
marker hypothesis is not confirmed by the neuroimaging studies mentioned, 
which does at least diminish its credibility. 
 However, the real problem with the limbic marker hypothesis, interpreted as 
an attempt at explaining the emergence of religion, is that it cannot meet the 
sufficiency constraint. Th e very reason why it can meet the noncircularity con-
straint rather easily—the non-cognitive character of the claimed neural/mental 
precondition for the emergence of religion—is just the problem here. For non-
cognitive states to give rise to a religion of sorts, they have to be interpreted as 
being experiences of some supernatural reality. Now of course this would be easy 
in the presence of a (dominant) religious tradition. Given a certain religious tradi-
tion, it is no mystery why and how certain non-cognitive emotional states can be 
interpreted as being experiences of some supernatural reality described in that tra-
dition. But of course this route would lead to immediate circularity: the religious 
tradition would be a precondition for the explanation of its own emergence. 
 So, the question is how these non-cognitive states can be interpreted as giving 
rise to beliefs about some religious reality in the absence of a pre-existing reli-
gious tradition.4 Th is is not a rhetorical question; it is possible to interpret non-
cognitive (emotional) states as experiences of something or other. It is certainly 
4  For the sake of brevity, we shall ignore an extra problem that arises as a result of the fact that 
various forms of ‘mental externalism’ are by now the orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind and the 
philosophy of the cognitive sciences. Originally, externalism was the thesis that the contents of 
mental states can be individuated only by referring also to the world outside of the mind (Putnam 
1975), or to the language community in which a thinker is brought up (Burge 1979). Recently, 
more radical forms of externalism have been developed, such as Clark and Chamers’ ‘extended 
mind’ (Clark and Chalmers 1998), according to which the mind itself is coconstituted by items 
outside of the head. On the Burge-form of externalism, it is impossible altogether to assign content 
to an experience without drawing on a pre-existing language community. If radical externalism is 
true, information about the neural basis of an experience may well be insufficient to determine 
content altogether. We shall ignore the issue of externalism here, because all forms of externalism
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imaginable, for instance, that specific emotional states are interpreted as experi-
ences of the presence of some sentient being. Th e point, however, is that this is 
not enough to view such non-cognitive states or emotional experiences as the 
sources for the emergence of some religious tradition. For such a tradition is 
founded on beliefs. And though interpreting a non-cognitive state as experience 
of  X is an important step towards the formation of a belief concerning the exis-
tence of X, it is not sufficient for the formation of such a belief in general and 
certainly not for the kind of belief relevant to the present context: a publicly 
shared belief. 
 Experiences of X do not spontaneously give rise to beliefs that X is the case. 
My experience of the book in front of me does not spontaneously lead to a full-
blown belief that there is indeed a book in front of me. It may lead to my assuming 
there to be a book in front of me, but I only really believe that when, for example, 
I reach for it and indeed feel a book-shaped object to be there. In such a case my 
visual experience is corroborated by an experience of the same object in a different 
sense-modality. Or it may lead to a full blown belief, because someone else that I 
observe looking at the same book, reports seeing the same book from a different 
angle; i.e. because I can—in the words of Donald Davidson—triangulate my 
experience with someone else’s experience of the same object. Corroboration 
and triangulation may perhaps not be necessary for the formation of subjective 
beliefs. But when it comes to beliefs that are publicly shared in the way that reli-
gious beliefs are shared—shaping the identities and lives of millions as well as 
shaping society to a significant degree—we move past the realm of subjective 
idiosyncrasies. Some extra epistemic (or quasi-epistemic) warrant is required. 
 Now the question is whether these extra epistemic procedures are available 
options in the case of religious experiences of the kind the ‘limbic marker hypoth-
esis’ claims are responsible for the emergence of religion. It does not require a lot 
of argument to claim that neither of the procedures mentioned are available 
options. Th ere is no other sense-modality by means of which we can experience 
the same religious reality (and the ‘limbic marker hypothesis’ does not claim there 
is). As for triangulation, this is not possible either. Triangulation requires us to be 
able to observe another subject observe or experience the numerically same real-
ity that we are observing or experiencing. And that is clearly impossible as well. 
are still contested, and the debate over the viability of externalism is far from over. We would like to 
stress, though, that from the viewpoint of the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of the cogni-
tive sciences, explanations of religion based on neuro-scientific evidence presuppose a theory about 
the content of mental states—internalism, the negation of externalism—that is by now very much 
a minority position. 
ARP 29_f6_65-85.indd   76 5/19/07   1:46:39 PM
 N. P. Azari, M. Slors / Archive for the psychology of Religion 29 (2007) 67-85 77
 Here it can be claimed that corroboration and triangulation are indeed 
required for obtaining reliable beliefs only. Th ey are logical demands. But here we 
are talking about psychological reality, and more oft en than not people are some-
what irrational.5 Couldn’t religious beliefs be the result of a rationally indefen-
sible epistemic procedure, to which people are nevertheless prone given their 
psychological make-up? 
 Maybe. However, what is of interest for the alleged neuroscientific explana-
tion of religion is whether or not this specific irrationality can be given a purely 
neuroscientific explanation. It seems to us that this cannot be the case. Th e rea-
son for this is that there are many experiences that are epistemologically on a par 
with religious experiences and for which we can find neurological sufficient con-
ditions that nevertheless do not give rise to beliefs of the kind involved in reli-
gion. For instance, hallucinations, dreams and experiences of voices heard by 
psychotics do not usually give rise to beliefs and practices similar to religion. And 
then there are experiences that are epistemologically similar to religious experi-
ences and that do give rise to beliefs, but of a slightly different kind than religious 
ones. Experiences of ghosts may be cases in point. Th ese did give rise to beliefs 
and belief-systems we know from spiritualism. But spiritualism is a belief-system 
that is subtly but significantly different from institutionalized religion. Th ings 
like creation myths, notions of salvation, and purely symbolic (i.e. non-manipu-
lative) rituals, are sometimes present in spiritualist belief-systems. If so, however, 
they derive from religion which is very oft en mixed with spiritualist beliefs. Spir-
itualism itself does not give us these notions, which can be seen by considering 
the fact that there are secular versions of spiritualism that do not contain them. 
 So, our point is this: experiences that resemble religious experiences in that 
the neural substrates are (ideally) known and in their epistemological status, are 
nevertheless different from religious experiences in that they do not lead to sys-
tems of belief and practice that resemble religion. Our point is not that this 
implies that it is impossible to explain how specific experiences that are allegedly 
hardwired in our brains can give rise to religion. Our point is that though these 
hard-wired experiences may or may not be necessary for the explanation of reli-
gion, they can never be sufficient. For such an explanation, neuroscientific data 
presumably need to be supplemented with various sociological, psychological 
and epistemological considerations that are obviously much too substantial to 
count as mere background conditions. 
5  Th is is why e.g. Nick Zangwill’s rational critique of the possibility of religious experience is 
largely irrelevant for the present discussion. See Zangwill (2004). 
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 Th e upshot of this is that there cannot be a naturalistic explanation of religion 
primarily in terms of neuroscientific data. Hence the sufficiency condition is 
violated. 
 Th e Cognitivist Alternatives 
 So the limbic marker hypothesis does well with regard to the noncircularity con-
straint but fails at the sufficiency constraint. Th ings appear to be significantly 
different with the more cognitivist alternatives for the hypothesis that are sup-
ported by the findings of the neuroimaging studies discussed above. Prima facie, 
these alternatives appear to have no problems with the sufficiency constraint and 
serious problems with the noncircularity constraint. But we shall argue that 
things are exactly the other way round. 
 What Newberg et al. and Azari et al. found was that among the areas of the 
brain involved in the religious experiences they studied are those regularly asso-
ciated with cognitive tasks. In other words, these religious experiences are found 
to have a cognitive component; roughly: they involve beliefs and concepts. 
Hence, these cognitivist studies of religious experiences do much better with 
respect to the sufficiency constraint than the limbic marker hypothesis. For this 
time there are no particular problems with interpreting a nonconceptual experi-
ence in terms such that the experience gives rise to beliefs; the beliefs are already 
part of the experience. So let us put the sufficiency constraint to one side for a 
moment. 
 As soon as we ask where these beliefs come from, we can see that there are 
serious prima facie difficulties with the noncircularity constraint. It is more than 
likely that these concepts and beliefs reflect the religious traditions in which the 
subjects were involved. Not only do the descriptions the subjects give of their 
own religious experiences betray the traditions in which they stand, but the ways 
in which the experiences in these studies are induced also involve clear reference 
to pre-existing religious traditions. In the studies by Azari et al., religious experi-
ences are induced through recitation of Psalm 23. In Newberg et al., the subjects 
used the meditation methods of Tibetan Buddhism, e.g. using incense that is 
associated with religion or religious experiences through tradition. Th e religious 
experiences studied by the experiments by Newberg and Azari, then, clearly 
presuppose a pre-existing religious tradition. Th erefore, these experiences cannot 
be used to explain the emergence of religious traditions on pain of vicious 
circularity. 
 But here’s the catch: neither Azari nor Newberg claim that religious experi-
ences alone can explain religion. Newberg, together with d’Aquili (and unlike 
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Azari), does claim that religion can be given a primarily neuroscientific explana-
tion, but this explanation is not based purely on experiences. In fact, in the fourth 
chapter of their book, Newberg and d’Aquili claim to give a neuroscientific expla-
nation for the emergence of myths, which they plausibly regard as the founda-
tions of religion and religious traditions. For the sake of the argument we may 
presume that such an explanation of myth, if cogent, is sufficient to account—in 
neuroscientific terms—for exactly that what is presupposed by the religious 
experiences in the studies by Newberg et al and Azari et al. Th ese experiences 
may serve to explain the sustenance of religion while their underlying myths may 
serve to explain the emergence of religion. Th us, the noncircularity constraint is 
not violated. 
 Th e sufficiency constraint is not violated, however, if and only if the neuro-
scientific explanation of myth offered by Newberg and d’Aquili is cogent. Our 
point is that it isn’t. 
 According to Newberg and d’Aquili, the emergence of myths can be explained 
in terms of (i) what they term the ‘cognitive imperative’, the irresistible, biology-
driven need to comprehend things by means of a cognitive analysis of reality, 
(ii) the ability to anticipate and to fear what is anticipated (most importantly 
one’s own death), (iii) what they call ‘the causal operator’, i.e. the tendency to 
postulate causes for unexplained phenomena, and (iv) what they term ‘the binary 
operator’, i.e. the tendency to understand the reality in which we live in terms of 
opposing concepts such as ‘light’ and ‘darkness’, ‘heaven’ and ‘hell’, etc. All four 
elements, we may assume, have neuroscientific explanations. Elements (i) and 
(ii) explain the fact that we humans tend to be concerned with crucial questions 
about life and the human condition (e.g. what happens when we die?). Element 
(iv) explains the fact that we tend to frame those questions in terms of binary 
oppositions (e.g. life and death). And finally, (iii) explains how we find answers 
in terms of some ‘hidden’ part of reality—an aft erlife, a spiritual world—that 
accounts for the manifest features of reality that cause fear and/or anxiety. Th e 
main purpose of these myths, then, according to Newberg and d’Aquili, is to take 
away this fear or anxiety. 
 One problem with this explanation is that many crucially important features 
of myths are not accounted for. Most or all religious myths, for instance, 
contain stories about the creation of the universe that are such that the structure 
of the tribe or society in which the myth functions is justified. A river, for 
instance, can be identified with, say, a mythical snake while the various sections 
of the river represent the various clans in the tribe who holds the myth and their 
interrelations. Another example: peoples are depicted as ‘the chosen’, and are attrib-
uted rights and duties accordingly. Yet another: Chiefs of tribes are sometimes 
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identified with celestial constellations, which invokes the need to devise cyclical 
conceptions of time and rituals in which the chief ‘becomes’ his forefather. Etc. etc. 
Th is sociological aspect of myth—the import of which cannot be underestimated—
is simply ignored by Newberg and d’Aquili. 
 Another problem is the usually non-logical character of myth. If the main 
purpose of myth is to take away fear and anxiety by means of stories portraying a 
hidden reality that ‘causes’ manifest reality, why not stick to simpler and more 
logical stories (in fact the fictional examples Newberg and d’Aquili give are fairly 
logical, but in that respect they do not resemble actual myths). 
 But the main problem is this: despite the fact that all elements of the explana-
tion for the emergence of myths apply to all normally functioning people, we 
must conclude that not all people develop myths or live by already developed 
myths. Despite the fact that (i)-(iv) apply to all normally functioning people, we 
cannot but observe that for a significant part of the western European and Amer-
ican population at least, God has gone away. Th ere are simply too many atheists 
and agnostics at present to consider them not normally functioning. And since 
(i)-(iv) will apply to them as well, we must conclude that (i)-(iv) are not sufficient 
to explain the emergence of real myths and consequently religion. 
 So, even if we grant the claim that (i)-(iv) can be given purely neuroscientific 
explanations, this is not sufficient to claim that myths can be given a purely 
neuroscientific explanation. Hence, even if we grant that the step from myth to 
religion is small enough to ignore, religious experiences of the kind involved in 
the studies by Newberg et al. and Azari et al. are not explained in purely 
neuroscientific terms since they presuppose myths and traditions that are not 
themselves explained in purely neuroscientific terms. 
 In other words, the sufficiency constraint is not met. Th is result is a conse-
quence of the way in which violating the noncircularity constraint was avoided 
(by invoking the idea of a neuroscientific explanation of myth). So, the cognitiv-
ist alternatives for the limbic marker hypothesis fail in a similar way to explain 
religion in primarily neuroscientific terms: by avoiding the noncircularity con-
straint, the sufficiency constraint must be violated. 
 III. Summary and Conclusion 
 In this paper, we started with a discussion of explanations of religion on the basis 
of abnormal brain states, localized to the limbic system—the limbic marker 
hypothesis. Next we discussed neuroimaging studies on religious experiences 
and concluded that they did not corroborate the limbic marker hypothesis and 
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concurring explanations of religion. What these studies suggest is that religious 
experiences have a strong cognitive component, something that does not fit with 
the hypothesis. But we concluded that at least some of the neuroimaging 
researchers still claim that religion can be explained in terms of the neuroscientific 
study of religious experience (i.e., functional brain imaging data). 
 To investigate the viability of that claim, we next articulated the conditions to 
be met by such an explanation: (1) the noncircularity constraint and (2) the 
sufficiency constraint. We argued that neither the limbic marker hypothesis nor 
its cognitivist alternatives can meet the sufficiency constraint due to the different 
ways in which they manage to avoid the noncircularity constraint. We conclude, 
therefore, the data from functional neuroimaging studies of religious experience 
are not suited for an explanation of religion. 
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